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1  Introduction
A central idea in contract law, around in some form since at least the time 
of Aristotle (if not before) is the idea of commutative justice. One might 
transpose this to Latin and say that each is entitled to his quid pro quo under 
a contract. In South African contract law we prefer to describe this concept 
as the principle of “reciprocity”, while other legal systems might use instead 
terms such as “mutuality” or “synallagma”. Most bilateral contracts will 
involve an element of exchange between the parties, with one performance 
being given in return for another. In such a state of affairs, performance (or at 
least the tender of performance) by one party becomes conditional upon the 
right of the other party to receive counter-performance. Since performance 
by one party is conditional upon performance by the other, this entails a 
concomitant right to withhold performance should counter-performance not 
be given or at least tendered. In the words of Jansen JA:
“Die grondslag van hierdie verweer [the exceptio non adimpleti contractus] is die erkenning daarvan 
dat by sommige kontrakte (wederkerige kontrakte) waaruit wedersydse verpligtinge voortvloei, daar 
wesenlik ’n uitruiling van prestasies beoog word, met oa die gevolg dat die een party nie verplig is om 
sy prestasie te verrig nie alvorens die ander op sy beurt sy teenprestasie verrig…Gerieflikheidshalwe 
sal voortaan in hierdie uitspraak van die ‘wederkerigheidsbeginsel’ gepraat word, terwyl die reg om ’n 
prestasie as uitvloeisel daarvan terug te hou die ‘weerhoudingsreg’ genoem sal word…”1
The question, however, is when can obligations be said to be reciprocal? 
Corbett J suggested in ESE Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Cramer2 (“ESE 
Financial Services”) that obligations were reciprocal when the performances 
of both parties represented “concurrent conditions”, in other words where a 
simultaneous exchange was envisaged.3 An example of this scenario would be 
the exchange of the merx for the purchase price under a cash sale.4 Alternatively, 
one performance might be the “condition precedent” for the other – such as 
where an independent contractor must complete his work in full before the 
* The author would like to express his thanks to his father, Professor Dale Hutchison, to Professor Jaco 
Barnard-Naudé and to the anonymous reviewers for their comments on a draft of this paper
1 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 1 SA 391 (A) 415H per Jansen JA:
“The basis of this defence is the acknowledgement that with certain contracts (reciprocal contracts) 
from which reciprocal obligations flow, an exchange of performances is intended  Amongst other 
things, this has the consequence that one party is not obligated to tender his performance unless the 
other performs in return… For the sake of convenience this will be termed the ‘reciprocity principle’ 
from here on in this judgment, while the right to retain performance which flows from this, will be 
termed the ‘right of retention’…” (own translation)
2 1973 2 SA 805 (C)
3 808H-809A
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employer is obliged to counter-perform.5 Whether performances under a 
contract fall into either of these categories is thus a question of interpretation 
of the contract in question.6 Interpretation would also determine the sequence 
of performance required.7
If reciprocity then refers to a state of affairs where the performance and 
counter-performance of contractual obligations are conditionally linked, then 
the concomitant right of such a party – as stated by Jansen JA in BK Tooling 
(Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk (“BK Tooling”) above 
– is to withhold performance should counter-performance not be forthcoming. 
This weerhoudingsreg (or right of retention) is a self-help mechanism in South 
African contract law, which is given effect to by a defence with the historical 
name of exceptio non adimpleti contractus.8 This is a simple contractual 
device by which a party to a reciprocal contract may refuse to perform should 
his counter-party not perform and stands therefore as a potential defence to a 
claim for specific performance.9
The statement of the law so far is established in the historical sources as well 
as in the judgments of the Appellate Division (and later the Supreme Court 
of Appeal). The problem is that this bald restatement fails to take account of 
all the nuances of possible factual problems which have been thrown up over 
the course of history. What follows is an attempt to shed light on some of the 
major problems which have faced past courts, in this country and others, in 
resolving disputes involving reciprocal obligations. Once a right to withhold 
performance is recognised, an immediate inquiry must take place as to 
whether that retention is justified and whether the principle of reciprocity is 
served or undermined by upholding the refusal to perform. Ultimately many 
of these questions involve issues of what is fair inter partes – a consideration 
which has led to several glosses on the basic rules stated above.
This article will proceed in part two to discuss the historical origins of the 
concept of reciprocity in contract law. From there, in part three, the notion of 
reciprocity in the conclusion of a contract will be considered, again this section 
will be largely historical. Part four will give an account of the concomitant 
doctrines of specific performance and exceptio non adimpleti contractus. 
These concepts will be dealt with historically and comparatively, but with a 
special focus on South African law. Part five will deal with issues of reciprocity 
involved when a contract is repudiated, part six with the consequences which 
reciprocity entails for parties following the termination of a contract, whether 
through breach or because it is voidable. Finally part seven will deal with the 
difficult issue of divisibility of obligations or performances in contract law, 
while part eight will conclude.
5 808A-B
6 ESE Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Cramer 1973 2 SA 805 (C) 809H-811A; BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v 
Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 1 SA 391 (A) 418B-C  
7 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 1 SA 391 (A) 418C-E
8 415H-416A
9 See the discussion of BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 1 SA 
391 (A) in part 4 3 below and for further details, S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & 
GF Lubbe Contract: General Principles 3 ed (2007) 388-391; RH Christie & GB Bradfield The Law of 
Contract in South Africa 6 ed (2011) 437-440
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2  Reciprocal contracts through the ages
In a very useful account of the history of the philosophy underpinning 
contract law, Gordley argues that Aristotle’s views on justice played a 
formative role in medieval legal thought. This influence was prevalent in the 
writings of authors from the times of St Thomas Aquinas right up to Grotius 
and only waned thereafter during the natural law years of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. It seems fitting therefore, in an account of the 
philosophical impact of the value of reciprocity in contract law, to begin with 
Aristotle’s views on the concept.
For Aristotle there were two types of justice: commutative and distributive. 
Distributive justice is reflected in the ways in which “honours or wealth 
or anything else [are] divided among members of a community who share 
in a political system”.10 Distributive justice would be determined by the 
type of political system a state followed.11 Commutative justice concerned 
“rectification in transactions”.12 Transactions could be voluntary, such as 
the different forms of contracting, or involuntary, such as theft or murder.13 
Commutative justice is ensured by enforcing numerical equity in exchange – 
this is the role of the judge.14 Agreements for Aristotle thus required that what 
was tendered by one party had to be the arithmetic equivalent of the other 
party’s performance.
In Roman law, by contrast, little effort was spent on theorising.15 There 
was no general law of contract: contracts were classified by type (such as 
the consensual contracts of sale, lease and pledge) and had particular rules 
depending on which category the contract fell into. Certain other types of 
obligation were enforceable due to the verbal formula used (stipulation) or the 
entry of the obligation into a ledger. There were also innominate contracts, 
such as barter, which did not fit into any of the groups. The remedy for breach 
of contract was damages,16 although a lack of performance of an innominate 
contract by one party rendered the agreement unenforceable.17 The type of 
theorising on the topic of reciprocity as evidenced in the writings of Aristotle 
was absent from Roman law, although Gordley points to the remedy of the 
laesio enormis, by which a contract for the sale of land could be set aside if the 
price fixed therein was less than half the “just” price.18 Most of the theorising 
on Roman law was to take place in later years, following the rediscovery of 
the Corpus Iuris Civilis in the middle ages.
Scholars in this period “rediscovered” the old Roman law as laid down 
in the Corpus Iuris.19 At the same time there was a widespread revival of 





15 J Gordley The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (1991) 32
16 J Dawson “Specific Performance in France and Germany” (1959) Mich L Rev 495 497-498
17 Gordley Philosophical Origins 31
18 33
19 O Robinson, T Fergus & W Gordon European Legal History 3 ed (2000) 42-43
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learning going on, centred largely around the Christian church.20 Thus it is 
not surprising that the next major thinker to be discussed here wrote not on 
the civil law, but rather on Christian moral philosophy. St Thomas Aquinas 
is accredited with being one of the leading thinkers of this period and his 
moral philosophy drew heavily on the texts of Aristotle, which had recently 
been translated into Latin.21 Aristotle had characterised justice as a virtue,22 
and in the same way this philosopher saw generosity as a virtue.23 Thus an 
agreement to donate would display the virtue of generosity, as opposed to that 
of commutative justice.24 This was used by St Thomas Aquinas to characterise 
agreements into two types: those displaying the virtue of generosity and those 
displaying the virtue of commutative justice.25 Thus equality in exchange was 
a requirement for all agreements outside of the sphere of liberality.26 This 
idea was to have a profound impact on the thinking of future generations of 
scholars in the field of law. Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy has been shown 
by Gordley to have shaped much of the legal developments which followed 
in later years from the time of the Commentators onwards until it fell out of 
fashion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the rise of natural 
law philosophy.27 Gordley argues further that the centrality of values such 
as fairness in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy presents a counter point to 
much of what is wrong with the classical contract model of the nineteenth 
and early 20th centuries.28 He advances this as a diagnosis, rather than a cure, 
aiming to restore the important tool of value-based reasoning to the judicial 
function.29 The first context in which the idea of reciprocity as fairness will be 
considered is the conclusion of a contract.
3  Reciprocity in the conclusion of a contract
Contract is commonly perceived as being a means of facilitating exchange. 
According to Aristotle, commutative justice was a requirement of exchanges, 
yet the concepts of freedom of contract and equivalence of performance have 
been difficult to reconcile with each other down the ages. Modern Anglophone 
systems of contract typically require “consideration” for the enforceability 
of a contractual promise, yet does this mean that reciprocity is required 
in the conclusion of a contract? An even more vexing question is whether 
equivalence in exchange could be a goal of modern contract law. The tracing 
of the reciprocity principle in the roots of our modern law will begin with the 
concept of causa as formulated by medieval jurists.
20 72-74
21 Gordley Philosophical Origins 3
22 Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics v, 1129b25-30
23 iv, 1120a5
24 iv, 1120a5-15
25 Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica (trans Blackfriars 1972) II-II q61, a3  See also II-II q77, q78 and 
q117  
26 It should be noted that Thomas Aquinas did not view liberality as being an aspect of justice, but rather of 
charity (Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica II-II q117, a5)
27 This is the main argument advanced in Gordley Philosophical Origins
28 See Gordley Philosophical Origins, particularly ch 9
29 231
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Bartolus and Baldus, the most famous protagonists of the age of the 
Commentators,30 are accredited with formulating the doctrine of causa.31 
Since the inspiration of the commentators was the Corpus Iuris Civilis, it is 
from texts therein that the doctrine of causa was formulated.32 According to 
this theory, a contract must be concluded based on a causa, or reason. Only 
two types of reasons were acceptable: liberality or reciprocal exchange.33
This distinction was maintained during the age of the late scholastics in 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. This group of scholars combined 
Roman law with the philosophy of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, which 
Gordley describes as a period of synthesis.34 The late scholastics categorised 
all contracts as onerous (causa onerosa) or gratuitous (causa gratuita). 
Gordley argues that this distinction was aimed more at explaining the reason 
for contracting than limiting a contract’s enforcement, since illegal contracts 
were still prohibited, quite apart from this doctrine.35
In Roman Dutch law this same distinction can also be found in the writings 
of Grotius, who was influenced by the late scholastics.36 In his chapter, “On 
Contracts” in De Iure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius divides acts performed for the 
benefit of others into acts of “kindness” and acts which are “reciprocal”.37 All 
acts of benefit to others, except “mere kindnesses” are contracts.38 Contracts by 
definition require equality in exchange, and the party who receives less acquires 
a right of action against the other party.39 This reinforces the late scholastic 
view of contractual conclusion, which holds that contracts are enforceable 
if they are made for a good causa and accepted by the promisee.40 Grotius 
himself discusses the concept of “redelicke oorzaecke” in his Introduction to 
Dutch Jurisprudence,41 a passage which was to have much airing later in the 
South African Appellate Division.42 Thus reciprocity in the form of causa was 
required for the conclusion of contracts in the late scholastics and the writings 
of the pre-eminent Roman Dutch scholar, Grotius.43
Gordley describes how the rise of natural law philosophy in the seventeenth 
century saw a waning of the influence of Aristotle. Reciprocity in the conclusion 
30 Robinson et al European Legal History 66-67
31 Gordley Philosophical Origins 49; R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the 
Civilian Tradition (1990) 551
32 Gordley Philosophical Origins 49-57 cites D 2 14 7 1, D 12 7 1 and D 44 4 2 3 as key examples of these 





37 Grotius De Iure Belli ac Pacis (trans F Kelsey 1925) II, xii, 1-2 available at <http://heinonline org/HOL/
Page?handle=hein beal/cilnc0002&id=389&collection=beal&index=beal/cilnc> (accessed 16-02-2012)
38 II, xii, 7
39 II, xii, 8
40 Gordley Philosophical Origins 73
41 Grotius Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence (trans A Maasdorp 1903) III, I, 52
42 Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279
43 It should be noted, however, that the requirement of causa for the conclusion of a valid contract is absent 
from the writings of other notable Roman Dutch scholars, such as Voet, Groenewegen and Vinnius  See 
Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279 288  D Hutchison “Contract Formation” in R Zimmermann & D Visser 
(eds) Southern Cross (1996) 165 notes at 166 n 8 that some Roman Dutch law authors, such as Van der 
Keesel and Van Leeuwen, did support Grotius’ view
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of a contract in the form of the idea of a causa did not vanish, however, as we 
have already seen in an examination of the work of the natural law scholar, 
Grotius. Indeed the doctrine of causa can still be found in the works of Pothier 
in the eighteenth century. Pothier states in his Treatise on the Law of Obligations 
that every contract should have a “just cause”.44 In contracts of mutual interest, 
the cause lay in the thing given or done; in contracts of beneficence the cause 
was liberality.45 Through the influence of Pothier, this concept made its way 
into the French Code Civil in 1804. Today article 1184 holds that a “resolutive 
condition” is implied by law into every reciprocal contract that if one of the two 
parties does not carry out his obligation, the other will have the choice whether 
to compel performance or to terminate the contract and seek damages.46 
The fate of causa in Germany was less successful. Zimmermann describes 
the role of causa as facilitating a transition from the formalities required of 
the specific forms of contracts in Roman law to the modern idea that “every 
agreement begets an action”.47 The idea of causa was not adopted in the 
writings of Pufendorf, who required instead two “acts of volition” on the part 
of each party to form a “pactum” – as opposed to a promise (promissio).48 
This was later merged with the thinking of Wolff, who introduced the modern 
German term, “Vertrag”, which was formed by “coinciding declarations of 
intention”.49 Today the German Civil Code makes no mention of causa in the 
section on formation of contracts – the inquiry into the existence of a contract 
is done by offer and acceptance analysis.50
In a parallel development, the English common law of contract had, prior to 
the nineteenth century, come up with the doctrine of consideration, which was 
necessary to found an action of assumpsit.51 Exactly what consideration meant 
had not yet crystallised, which led to nineteenth century English writers on 
contract drawing on the earlier works of Blackstone, who equated this concept 
with the civil law’s causa.52 Consideration was thus explained as the “motive” 
or “reason” for contracting.53 It was only in the times of Holmes and Pollock 
that the doctrine of consideration was reformulated as a bargain or exchange.54 
This, combined with the notion of freedom of contract, meant that whatever “a 
man chooses to bargain for must be conclusively taken to be of some value to 
44 Pothier Obligations (trans W Evans 1853) § 42. 
45 § 42
46 Text paraphrased from the translation: G Rouhette & A Rouhette-Berton “Civil Code” (2006) Legifrance 
<http://www legifrance gouv fr/Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-translations> (accessed 13-03-2013)  
See also Zimmermann Obligations 803
47 Zimmermann Obligations 553
48 568
49 568-569
50 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (“BGB”) §§ 145-157  Translation taken from the Bundesministerium der Justiz, 
available at: <http://www gesetze-im-internet de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb html#p0426> (accessed 
07-02-2012)
51 Gordley Philosophical Origins 137; A Simpson A History of the Common Law of Contract (1975) ch VII
52 W Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (1766) 2 444-446  Compare Gordley Philosophical 
Origins 137-139; Zimmermann Obligations 557 n 79; A Simpson “Innovation in Nineteenth Century 
Contract Law” (1975) 91 LQR 247 262-263
53 Gordley Philosophical Origins 171
54 Gordley Philosophical Origins 172; J Dawson Gifts and Promises (1980) 203-204
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him”.55 Thus, provided there is some form of demonstrable “bargain” at play, 
the law will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration.56 This remains 
true of English contract law today.57 
Thus the common law recognises reciprocity in the sense that a contract 
must involve an exchange, or bargain, of some sort. The literal sense of the 
term reciprocity – equivalence in exchange – however, is lacking. Reciprocity, 
in this sense, is absent from the formation of contracts in English law and 
indeed from modern contract law in general.
A final discussion of the South African context is needed to conclude the 
brief discussion of reciprocity in contract formation. The South African 
law of contract represents a mixture of Roman Dutch civil law and English 
contract law. Over the years, the kinks have been ironed out and there is now 
a coherent body of law. In the early 20th century, however, there was still a 
situation of confusion as to exactly what the “proper” rules of South African 
contract law entailed. In the context of the requirements for the conclusion of 
a valid contract, there were those – including the Chief Justice of the newly 
unified South Africa (De Villiers CJ) – who favoured the inclusion of the 
doctrine of consideration as a requirement for contracting.58 The Appellate 
Division settled the question in 1919, however, in Conradie v Rossouw.59 By 
this time De Villiers CJ had passed away and the Appellate Division held 
unanimously that a contract required only a seriously intended offer and a 
corresponding acceptance for its conclusion (provided performance under the 
contract was legal and possible).60 Grotius’s concept of redelijke oorzaak61 
(or causa) was not the same as consideration in the common law sense of that 
word and was not a requirement for a binding contract in South Africa.62 Thus 
a bare agreement (that is, without consideration) is binding in South Africa 
on the basis of consensus alone where that consensus is freely given with the 
intention of creating a legally binding contract.63 (Reliance, as a separate basis 
for a contract, was adopted separately and came to the fore in the context of 
mistake in particular.)64
Although in South Africa the resolution of the causa/consideration debate 
saw the dismissal of the bargain theory in this country, the idea of causa still 
manifests itself in certain areas. It may no longer be an essential requirement 
55 Gordley Philosophical Origins 172, citing F Pollock Principles of Contract (1885) 172
56 E Peel Treitel The Law of Contract 13 ed (2011) 3-013–3-016; E McKendrick Contract 2 ed (2005) 161; 
MP Furmston Chesire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract 15 ed (2007) 106
57 See for example the sources listed in n 56
58 For the views of De Villiers CJ, see Alexander v Perry 1874 4 Buch 59; Tradesmen’s Benefit Society v Du 
Preez 1887 5 SC 269 and Mtembu v Webster 1904 21 SC 323
59 1919 AD 279
60 297 per Solomon ACJ, 320 per De Villiers AJA
61 Note that this variant spelling of the concept was used in the Appellate Division judgment
62 See the judgment of De Villiers AJA  See also Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 
3 SA 978 (A) for an application of the requirement of causa in the context of negotiable instruments  
Zimmermann Obligations 558 notes that Grotius seems to use the term “redelicke oorzaecke” in a very 
“untechnical” sense as indication that the law recognises the agreement as “reasonable, acceptable and 
thus enforceable”
63 Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279 297
64 Christie & Bradfield The Law of Contract 10-12; Hutchison “Contract Formation” in Southern Cross 
180-194
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for contractual validity, but still plays a role in the law of negotiable 
instruments and unjustified enrichment. Equality in exchange is a noble ideal 
in contract law, yet appears to have died out with the commercialisation of 
contract law in the progression towards modern times. Thus reciprocity in the 
sense of equivalence in exchange is not a requirement of any of the modern 
legal systems examined above. However, this does not necessarily exclude 
reciprocity from other areas of law. The next investigation will be into the role 
of reciprocity in the enforcement of contracts.
4  Reciprocity in the enforcement of contracts
4 1  Origins of specific performance as a contractual remedy and the 
concomitant defence of exceptio non adimpleti contractus
One of the aims of this article is to highlight the “fairness” aspect entwined 
in much of the court-made law based on reciprocity in contract. Since a 
large part of fairness between parties involves the upholding of contractual 
promises, the focus will be narrowed from here to the devices by which 
counter-performance is enforced in reciprocal contracts. This development 
must, however, be notionally predicated upon the idea that contracts (to the 
extent that this word was appropriate in ancient times) are binding. To keep the 
focus on modern Western law, this account of the enforceability of contractual 
obligations shall begin with the Roman position.
The Romans had no general right of rescission from agreements, although a 
situation of “functional synallagma” pertained, whereby a party to a reciprocal 
agreement could refuse to perform if the other party’s counter-performance 
was not forthcoming.65 The primary remedy for breach of contract in classical 
Roman law was damages.66 In this system a judge was empowered to refuse 
to order performance of bonae fidei iudicia (contracts such as sale and lease) 
on account of the good faith nature of those transactions.67 In medieval times 
the influence of the canon law saw the end of distinctions between formal 
types of contracting and all contracts became iudicia bonae fidei.68 Along 
with this development came the idea of pacta sunt servanda, whereby all 
agreements are binding, regardless of form.69 The Roman right to refuse to 
counter-perform where the opposing performance in a reciprocal contract was 
not forthcoming, came to be known as the exceptio non adimpleti contractus 
from about the fifteenth century onwards.70
The exceptio non adimpleti contractus as a technical rule giving effect 
to the principle of reciprocity in the enforcement of contracts is premised 
on the notion that a party may ensure he obtains the promised performance 
65 Zimmermann Obligations 800-801
66 Dawson (1959) Mich L Rev 496
67 Dawson (1959) Mich L Rev 496; Zimmermann Obligations 770-772  
68 R Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) 220
69 Zimmermann Obligations 576
70 801 n 133
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through a court order compelling the other party to perform.71 Specific 
performance as an enforcement procedure came to the fore as a legal 
conundrum in medieval times. Bartolus and Baldus, drawing on the text 
of Corpus Iuris Civilis, distinguished obligations to give (which were 
specifically enforceable) from obligations to do – or not do – (which were 
not specifically enforceable).72 A person who had contracted (for example) 
to perform a task could not be compelled to follow through with it, since this 
would be a form of servitude.73 A second reason was that in a promise “to 
do” so much depended on the time and manner of performance, that the only 
fair remedy in the event of breach was damages.74
This distinction caught the mind of Pothier, who wrote in his Treatise on 
the Law of Obligations that an obligation to give was binding on the debtor,75 
whereas an obligation to do or not do was only enforceable in damages.76 
The distinction between obligations to give and to do is maintained in the 
Code Civil at article 1126. Article 1136 authorises the specific enforcement of 
obligations to give, while article 1142 authorises only the award of damages for 
obligations to do. In modern French law, specific enforcement of obligations 
to give is permitted, while enforcement of obligations to do is achieved by 
imposing fines (astreinte) on recalcitrant debtors in an attempt to “threaten” 
them into performing. As Dawson notes, this system lacks teeth since in the 
past the fines often remained unpaid.77 Modern authors, Lando and Rose, note 
that the difficulty in executing an order of specific enforcement has led French 
plaintiffs to prefer an award of damages.78
As to the exceptio non adimpleti contractus in French law, Nicholas notes 
that this is not dealt with in the Code Civil.79 This was due to a culture which 
veered away from self-help mechanisms in the law.80 Indeed the courts have 
only begun to allow this defence since the 20th century, hanging it on the peg of 
cause (the equivalent of causa).81 As the argument goes, in reciprocal contracts 
each obligation is the cause for its counterpart, hence non-performance of one 
justifies non-performance of the other.82 This is seen as operating only in the 
context of temporary non-performance, however, since article 1184 (discussed 
above) would permit an election whether to compel performance through the 
courts or to terminate the contract and seek damages.83
71 801 n 133  For modern South African authority see: Van der Merwe et al Contract 388-391; Christie & 
Bradfield The Law of Contract 437-440; JC de Wet & AH van Wyk Kontraktereg 5 ed (1992) 196-197
72 Dawson (1959) Michigan LR 504
73 Baldus Commentary on C 4 49 cited in Dawson (1959) Mich L Rev 504
74 Bartolus Commentary on D 45 1 72 cited in Dawson (1959) Mich L Rev 505
75 Pothier Obligations § 141
76 § 157-158
77 Dawson (1959) Mich L Rev 514-519
78 H Lando & C Rose “On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries” (2004) 24 Int’l 
Rev L & Econ 473 479  
79 B Nicholas The French Law of Contract 2 ed (1992) 213  Compare the brief discussions in Zimmermann 
Obligations 801 n 133 and BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 1 SA 
391 (A) 417  
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Thus reciprocity does play an important role in the enforcement of French 
contracts, but not to the same extent it plays a role in the German system, 
where the exceptio non adimpleti contractus is specifically incorporated in the 
BGB in article 320.84 The German law of specific performance proceeds from 
article 241 in the BGB, which gives a plaintiff a right to seek this remedy.85 
After requesting performance, however, the plaintiff must give the defendant 
a reasonable period in which to perform (a period known as Nachfrist).86 The 
right to specific enforcement is limited by factors such as impossibility (in 
particular) or where enforcement would require compulsion to be exercised 
in a personal relationship or over intellectual or artistic creativity.87 Where 
specific performance is allowed, a recalcitrant debtor may be threatened 
with a fine or imprisonment under the Code of Civil Procedure.88 Despite 
this feature, however, the empirical evidence seems to indicate that plaintiffs 
prefer to sue for damages, due to the difficulties involved in enforcing specific 
performance.89
In English law, the common law favours damages as the remedy for breach 
of contract.90 Specific performance is a remedy offered in equity and is 
only available at the discretion of a judge and not as of right.91 The typical 
scenario in which specific performance will not be allowed was suggested 
by Lord Hoffmann in Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores 
(Holdings) Ltd, where he stated that the defendants could not be compelled 
to run a business, since this would require constant supervision by a court.92 
This exemplifies the English reluctance to award specific performance in 
a contract for services.93 Indeed the sphere of application of this remedy is 
typically limited to contracts for the delivery of unique goods, or the transfer 
of immovable property.94 Given the limited scope of application of specific 
performance in the English law, it is not surprising that the exceptio non 
adimpleti contractus does not form part of this area of their law.95
The principle of reciprocity, or “mutuality”, as it is known in common law 
systems, does find an outlet in the English law with regard to the time for 
performance of contractual obligations. In this regard, contractual terms are 
classified into conditions precedent, concurrent conditions and independent 
promises with regard to the order in which performance is to occur.96 The 
84 Compare Zimmermann Obligations 800
85 B Markesinis, H Unberath & A Johnston The German Law of Contract (2006) 399
86 § 281 BGB  See Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 400
87 Dawson (1959) Mich L Rev 530; Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 406-418
88 Zivilprozessordnung (“ZPO”) § 888  See Lando & Rose (2004) Int’l Rev L & Econ 478
89 Lando & Rose (2004) Int’l Rev L & Econ 478-479; Dawson (1959) Mich L Rev 530  Compare K Zweigert 
& H Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law 3 ed (1998) 484
90 See for example: Peel Treitel The Law of Contract 20-002; McKendrick Contract 1138-1139, Furmston 
Chesire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Contract 750  
91 See sources listed in n 90 above
92 [1998] AC 1 15G-16C
93 McKendrick Contract 1139  See also s 236 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 
1992
94 McKendrick Contract 1139
95 M Hogg Promises and Contract Law: Comparative Perspectives (2011) 340
96 Compare J Carter “Suspending Contract Performance for Breach” in J Beatson & D Friedmann (eds) 
Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) 485 493-497
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word “condition” has various meanings in English law, from the contingent 
sense (in which it is used in South Africa) to a promissory sense, where it 
indicates that a breach of that type of term gives a right to terminate the 
contract. (Whereas if the term is a warranty (as opposed to a promissory 
condition), one may only claim damages in the event of a breach.)97 In what 
follows, a condition is referred to in its contingent sense.
In this contingent sense, a “condition precedent” refers to an obligation 
which must be performed prior to counter-obligation.98 For example, a 
building project must be completed before payment becomes due.99 If the 
prior performance is not tendered, the other party has a right to withhold his 
counter-performance.100 The same is true of a “concurrent condition”, except 
that performance here is due at the same time as counter-performance.101 
An “independent promise” occurs where a party is bound to perform even 
if the counter-performance is not forthcoming.102 The performing party in 
this instance may not withhold performance.103 Treitel states that for reasons 
of fairness, courts are reluctant to hold that terms constitute independent 
promises and the trend is in favour of concurrent conditions.104 Treitel thus 
argues that there is a functional equivalent to the exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus in English law.105
4 2  Specific performance in South African law
As a “mixed” legal system, the South African law of specific performance 
shows indications of both the common and civil law approaches. Thus the 
Appellate Division has asserted that, in accordance with our Roman Dutch law 
heritage, the primary remedy for breach of contract is specific performance 
and that the plaintiff has a right to this remedy.106 At the same time, however, 
specific performance has been said to be available at the discretion of the 
court.107 The leading case, Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society108 
(“Benson”), attempts to reconcile the conflict between these two strands by 
stating that although the “right” to specific performance is subject to a judicial 
discretion, this discretion is absolute and is not constrained by the guidelines 
97 McKendrick Contract 941; Peel Treitel The Law of Contract 18-039  
98 McKendrick Contract 942
99 942  Compare s 28 of the (English) Sale of Goods Act 1979, where a seller’s obligation to deliver goods is 
said to depend on the “condition precedent” of the buyer’s willingness to accept those goods and pay the 
purchase price
100 McKendrick Contract 942; G Treitel “‘Conditions’ and ‘Conditions Precedent’” (1990) 106 LQR 185 192; 
G Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract (1988) 276-277  




105 277  But see Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1992] 1 QB 656 666-667, 
discussed in Carter “Suspending Contract Performance” in Good Faith and Fault 485-486
106 Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 1 SA 776 (A) 782I-J
107 Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 2 SA 371 (A) 378H-379A
108 Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 1 SA 776 (A)
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as found in English law.109 These guidelines as had previously been set out 
by the Appellate Division were as follow: where damages would adequately 
compensate the plaintiff, where enforcement would be difficult to enforce, 
where alternative performance was readily available, where performance 
entails personal services or where enforcement would result in hardship.110
Cockrell argues that the judgment in Benson fails to adequately address the 
tension between a right and a discretion inherent in the South African position 
on specific performance.111 This would appear to be in line with the argument 
of Zweigert and Kötz, as well as Lando and Rose (discussed above) that in 
reality the common law and civil law rules on specific performance, while 
different on their face, produce much the same sort of result.112 In other words, 
that while a plaintiff may have a right to specific performance in civil law 
countries and in South Africa, judicial and practical constraints may make 
damages a preferable choice and thus impose a de facto limit on the plaintiff’s 
right, not too far removed from the legally recognised limits in common law 
systems.
4 3  BK Tooling and the exceptio non adimpleti contractus in South 
African law
As in civil law systems, the exceptio non adimpleti contractus arises in 
South African law as a defence to a claim for specific performance. If a party 
claiming specific performance has not himself performed, this is a valid 
ground for the opposing party to withhold counter-performance.113 Thus 
reciprocity is ensured when specific enforcement of a contract is sought in 
South Africa. Given the primacy of this remedy (as indicated above), the 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus has an important role to play in ensuring 
fairness inter partes. Indeed, even without reference to the exceptio non 
109 785F-G  For further comment on Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 1 SA 776 (A) see G 
Lubbe “Contractual Derogation and the Discretion to Refuse an Order for Specific Performance” in G 
Glover (ed) Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr (2006) 77 80-99  
110 Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 2 SA 371 (A) 378H-379A
111 A Cockrell “Breach of Contract” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) 303 330
112 There is a strong debate in law and economics literature as to the value of specific performance as a 
remedy for breach of contract  Certain scholars (for example, Kronman) are of the view that the costs 
involved in administering the remedy are not worth the ultimate result  This is disputed by others (for 
example, Schwartz) who argue that the remedy should be routinely available as a remedy (as it is in South 
Africa)  See: A Kronman “Specific Performance” (1978) 45 U Chi L Rev 351 and A Schwartz “The Case 
for Specific Performance” (1979) 89 Yale LJ 271  For a discussion of these arguments with reference to 
South Africa, see B van Heerden “An Exploratory Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Law” (1981) 
4 Responsa Meridiana 152
113 Smith v Van den Heever 2011 3 SA 140 (SCA) 144; Motor Racing Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v 
NPS (Electronics) Ltd 1996 4 SA 950 (A) 961-962; BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering 
(Edms) Bpk 1979 1 SA 391 (A) 415-416; Van der Merwe et al Contract 388; Christie & Bradfield The 
Law of Contract 437  A similar rule pertains in another “mixed” legal system: Scotland  See Inveresk 
plc v Tullis Russel Papermakers Ltd [2010] UKSC 19, 2010 SLT 941; Hogg Promises and Contract Law 
341-342; W McBryde The Law of Contract in Scotland 2 ed (2001) 20-44–20-61
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adimpleti contractus a court may refuse to order performance where the 
reciprocal counter-performance is not forthcoming.114
Jansen JA’s dictum cited in the introduction above appeared in the key 
South African contract case of BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision 
Engineering (Edms) Bpk,115 where the Appellate Division was called upon 
to resolve a dispute over payment for a defective performance under an 
agreement for services to be rendered by an independent contractor. At the 
heart of BK Tooling is the notion that a contracting party who has tendered 
a partially defective performance (which the defendant is using) should be 
entitled to a reciprocal performance of some description, despite the tendered 
performance as a whole not being entirely satisfactory.
In the BK Tooling case the Appellate Division was thus squarely faced with 
the problem of how to resolve the issues facing both parties following the 
tender of a defective performance. While this question had been raised in 
a trilogy of early Appellate Division cases,116 and had been much discussed 
by contract and enrichment textbook writers,117 it was only really settled in 
the BK Tooling case in 1979. The judgment of Jansen JA seemed to answer 
most of the questions posed by commentators and hence resolved much of the 
argument on this point, at least from a South African point of view.118
The facts of BK Tooling have been alluded to above and will be set out again 
in simplified form. A manufacturer of motor engine parts had contracted 
with an engineering firm to produce two sets of precision moulds for casting 
their goods. The specifications of the moulds were established in a written 
contract. The engineering firm produced the two moulds, but one of these 
proved defective in that it was not manufactured strictly in accordance with 
the contract specifications. Delivery of the moulds had already been taken by 
a representative of the employer, however, and it refused to return them upon 
discovering the default. The first mould was used by the engine manufacturer 
in spite of this and the second, defective, mould was sent to another firm of 
engineers to be adapted to the specifications. The first producer of the moulds 
claimed payment but the engine manufacturers refused, raising the exceptio 
non adimpleti contractus as their defence to a claim to enforce payment.
Jansen JA, for a unanimous Appellate Division, dealt in some detail with the 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus, from both an historical and a comparative 
perspective, and set out five points about the reciprocity principle and its 
application by means of the above-mentioned device:119
114 Miloc Financial Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Logistic Technologies (Pty) Ltd 2008 4 SA 325 (SCA) paras 50-52  
Here the releasing of shares held by a creditor as a pledge was held to be reciprocal to the debtor repaying 
him a separate debt, since it had been envisaged that the shares would be used to secure new finance to 
service the original loan  Payment of the original loan was suspended until such time as the shares would 
be released
115 1979 1 SA 391 (A)
116 Hauman v Nortje 1914 AD 293; Breslin v Hichens 1914 AD 312 and Van Rensburg v Straughan 1914 AD 
317
117 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 181; W de Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 3 ed (1987) 274-283
118 E Clive & D Hutchison “Breach of Contract” in R Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed Legal 
Systems in Comparative Perspective (2004) 176 197 note that the Scottish approach to this problem is less 
satisfactory than the South African one
119 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 1 SA 391 (A) 418A-419H
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(i) In contracts where an exchange of performances is envisaged, it is a 
question of interpretation as to whether those obligations are sufficiently 
connected for the reciprocity principle to apply.
(ii) The sequence of performances also depends on an interpretation of the 
contractual stipulations.
(iii) The right to retain performance under the exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus is a means to enforce performance, providing security to the 
party raising this defence. In this way it is like a pledge.
(iv) If the analogy of a pledge is correct, one can withhold one’s performance 
until counter-performance had been received in full.
(v) The burden of proof falls on the plaintiff (against whom the exceptio has 
been raised) to demonstrate that he has indeed performed his side of the 
contract.
The answer of the Appellate Division in the past to this type of problem had 
been to uphold the exceptio non adimpleti contractus defence, but to permit 
an enrichment claim to the plaintiff to recover a quantum meruit.120 In BK 
Tooling, Jansen JA held that where the exceptio non adimpleti contractus 
was employed by a defendant, a court could exercise its discretion to prevent 
unfairness to the plaintiff by awarding a reduced contract price.121 Since an 
order of specific performance could be granted – or not granted – by a court 
in its discretion, so too the defence of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus 
could be upheld or relaxed at the court’s discretion.122 The determination 
whether a right to payment was available would depend upon the utilisation 
of the performance by the defendant.123 While the contract was still in 
existence, the appropriate remedy lay in the law of contract and not in the law 
of enrichment.124 It was also not correct to talk of a quantum meruit, since this 
was an enrichment remedy.125 The correct remedy should be the awarding of 
a reduced contract price.126 In casu this was set at the contract price less the 
cost of remedying the defect.127
Thus BK Tooling stands as an important development of the exceptio non 
adimpleti contractus by the Appellate Division. Not only were the issues 
surrounding this defence discussed in great detail in the judgment, but the 
court went further too, clarifying that this self-help mechanism could lead 
to injustice if applied without thought to the context. Hence a measure of 
discretion needed to be employed when deciding whether to condone its 
use. Thus a potential role for considerations of fairness was found in the law 
surrounding the exception, tempering its potentially harsh consequences in 
the same way that specific performance had been tempered by earlier courts. 
The relaxation of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus in BK Tooling should 
120 See cases in n 116  Compare Zimmermann Obligations 801 n 133
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thus be seen as an example of value-based reasoning and an attempt to do 
justice between the parties.
In a later variation of facts not too far removed from BK Tooling, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal was faced in Thompson v Scholtz128 (“Thompson”) 
with the problem that a reduced contract price could not simply be calculated 
as the cost of making right the defect, where the performance in question 
was continuous and indivisible, namely providing full undisturbed use and 
occupation of premises under a lease agreement. In Thompson, the plaintiff 
had sold his farm to the defendant. In the approximately six months between 
conclusion of the sale agreement and transfer, the defendant was to farm the 
land in question and reside in the farmhouse. The plaintiff allowed him to 
farm, but did not vacate the farmhouse until transfer. Performance was thus 
incomplete and undoing the harm impossible, so what was the appropriate 
remedy? The defendant withheld occupational rent for the entire farm, arguing 
that counter-performance had not been forthcoming.
Nienaber JA for a unanimous SCA noted that a precise monetary value 
could not be placed on the use and enjoyment of the farmhouse in question.129 
He did, however, use the analogy of the remissio mercedis by which a court 
may allow a full or partial reduction in rental to compensate the lessee for 
interference with the use and enjoyment of the property in question.130 This 
analogy was used to justify a 25% reduction in the occupational rent due. 
Nienaber JA held that though this might be in favour of the defendant, it was 
equitable in the circumstances.131
A remaining question, however, is whether the interpretation of a contract 
can provide all the answers as to whether that contract creates reciprocal 
obligations, without which the exceptio cannot apply. This is wound up in 
propositions one and two of the above quoted dictum of Jansen JA about this 
defence. In Wynns Car Care Products (Pty) Ltd v First National Industrial 
Bank Ltd132 (“Wynns Car Care Products”) a lease was signed in terms of 
which the lessee hired computer equipment creating an obligation to pay 
monthly rental in return for the provision of goods. In an interlinked contract 
the lessor was to maintain those computers. When the lessee defaulted on the 
rent, the lessor tried to collect on the outstanding debt. The lessee then argued 
that the maintenance obligation had not been met and that since this was 
reciprocal to the payment of rent, the exceptio non adimpleti contractus was 
available as a justification for withholding rent. The question to be decided 
was thus whether these interlinked contracts did indeed create reciprocal 
obligations. Hefer JA held that a clause excluding the possibility of the lessee 
withholding rent due under the contract of lease “for any reason whatsoever” 
indicated clearly that the lease of computer equipment was not reciprocal to 
the provision of maintenance services.133




132 1991 2 SA 754 (A)
133 759A
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In Wynns Car Care Products the Appellate Division thus seemed to 
indicate approval for the proposition that one can exclude the application of 
the exceptio non adimpleti contractus by contract. Naudé and Lubbe discuss 
exemption clauses in a contribution provoked by the case of Afrox Healthcare 
Bpk v Strydom.134 Their article also draws on the work of Gordley and 
Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy to argue that an exclusion clause which 
attempts to infringe upon the “essence of a contract by undermining the basic 
relationship of reciprocity existing between the undertakings characteristic 
of the contract envisaged by the parties… should… be regarded as legally 
problematic”.135 Transposing this argument to the present context: in (for 
example) a contract such as sale, it would be legally problematic to attempt 
to exclude the exceptio as a remedy to withhold payment where the merx was 
not forthcoming. Similarly in a case such as Wynns Car Care Products, it may 
have been difficult to justify an exclusion of the ability of the lessee to withhold 
rent when the lessor was recalcitrant in supplying computer equipment.136 
Where reciprocity is not clearly established between obligations the issue is 
less clear, however. It is submitted that exemption clauses should be permitted 
to clarify that parties did not intend their obligations to be reciprocal, subject 
to public policy and, where applicable, the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 
2008. This would also accord with the approach in BK Tooling’s propositions 
one and two.
This section of the article has attempted to show that the reciprocity 
principle has deep roots in the philosophy of law and seems to be as old as the 
idea of promise-keeping and legally binding agreements. In both BK Tooling 
and Thompson the Supreme Court of Appeal was required to qualify the right 
of retention of performance, which arises due to the reciprocal nature of a 
contract, in the interests of fairness inter partes. The reciprocity principle 
can also therefore in this very real sense be seen as requiring fairness inter 
partes, so that each receives his quid pro quo. A related question with 
regard to withholding performance upon breach is whether a party’s right to 
performance is suspended by his repudiation of a counter-performance. This 
will be considered next.
5  Reciprocity and repudiation: suspension of performance
It is established law in South Africa (at High Court level) that where one 
party to a reciprocal contract repudiates it, the obligation of the opposing party 
to perform is suspended for so long as the repudiation stands, even where the 
repudiation has not yet resulted in the cancellation of the contract.137 This rule 
134 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) – see T Naudé & G Lubbe “Exemption Clauses – A Rethink Occasioned by Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom” (2005) 122 SALJ 441  
135 452
136 See the similar conclusion of Naudé & Lubbe (2005) SALJ 452 n 103
137 Erasmus v Pienaar 1984 4 SA 9 (T) 28I-30C; Moodley v Moodley 1990 1 SA 427 (D) 431C-I
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appears also to apply in English law.138 The facts of the leading South African 
case, Erasmus v Pienaar139 (“Erasmus”), illustrate the point:
Erasmus sold a farm to Pienaar in 1977, with the payment to be made in 
annual instalments. According to a clause in the written deed of sale, in the 
event of non-payment the contract could be cancelled 30 days after a written 
demand for payment had been issued. In 1983, the annual instalment, due on 
1 April was not forthcoming. Negotiations ensued, with Erasmus’ attorneys 
eventually writing to Pienaar on 26 July to cancel the contract. As a result of 
this letter, Pienaar did not pay the outstanding instalment. It was held by the 
court that notice of cancellation had been given before the seller was legally 
entitled to do this, which amounted to a repudiation of the contract.140 As 
a result the obligation of the buyer to pay the instalment was suspended.141 
Thus the seller could not rely on the failure to tender the instalment as a basis 
for cancellation of the contract.142 The court held, however, that the contract 
had been validly cancelled for a second ground of breach, namely a failure 
to maintain the farm, and hence the ejectment order sought by the seller, 
Erasmus, was granted.143
The basis of this finding was explained in Erasmus to be “waiver” by the 
repudiating party of his right to enforce counter-performance.144 This opinion 
was echoed by Nienaber J in Moodley v Moodley, where the reasoning of the 
court in Erasmus was followed.145 Carter argues that the same rule pertains in 
Anglo-Australian law, although he grounds it on the (closely related) basis of 
estoppel.146 The rule is said in those systems to stem from the earlier English 
case of Jones v Barkley.147 There an argument was upheld that repudiation148 
by one party of his obligation meant the absence of a “condition precedent” 
for the other’s counter-obligation and hence counter-performance was not 
enforced.149 Lord Mansfield stated in that case that the law would not require 
the doing of a “nugatory” act.150 Jones v Barkley was cited in Erasmus as 
authority, along with further English precedents.151
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts in the United States goes even 
further than the English position.152 According to section 251(1) of that model 
law, where the promisee has “reasonable grounds” to believe that the promisor 
138 Carter “Suspending Performance” in Good Faith and Fault 497-503  The English rule seems to date back 
to the decision in Jones v Barkley 1781 2 Doug 684; 99 ER 434, where what amounted to (in modern 
terminology) a repudiation resulted in the counter-obligation being dispensed with  






145 1990 1 SA 427 (D) 431C-I
146 Carter “Suspending Performance” in Good Faith and Fault 501
147 1781 2 Doug 684; 99 ER 434
148 As Carter points out (Carter “Suspending Performance” in Good Faith and Fault 499) there was as of yet 
no doctrine of repudiation in English contract law in those days, hence the terminology above reflects a 
modern analysis of the case
149 1781 2 Doug 684 694; 99 ER 434 440
150 1781 2 Doug 684 694; 99 ER 434 440
151 1984 4 SA 9 (T) 21-22
152 The Restatement (Second) Contracts was promulgated in 1981
RECIPROCITY IN CONTRACT LAW 19
       
will “commit a breach by non-performance” that would give rise to a claim for 
damages under the contract, the promisee may request “adequate assurance 
of due performance” and may suspend any counter-performance until he 
receives such assurance. Section 251(2) provides that a failure to provide 
adequate assurance within a reasonable time may be treated as a repudiation 
of the contract.153 This provision was an adaptation of section 2-609 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), which introduced a similar rule into the 
law of sale in the United States.154 In an article analysing these two provisions, 
Robertson notes that while extensive litigation has proceeded under section 
2-609 of the UCC, the equivalent provision of the Restatement (Second) has 
not received much attention in the courts. Thus this rule arguably does not 
represent a generalised common law of contracts in the United States outside 
of the law of sale.155
Carter nevertheless argues in favour of including such a self-help mechanism 
in Anglo-Australian law, suggesting that it prevents strategic behaviour by 
parties to a contract (by preventing the party who is to perform first from 
unfairly obtaining counter-performance) and thus reflects an enforcement of 
the principle of good faith.156 Critics might argue, however, that the existing 
rules on anticipatory breach and repudiation go far enough in South Africa. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal has held that repudiation of a contract is determined 
objectively and not subjectively and hence repudiation may be inferred from 
the conduct of a party, regardless of his good faith intention to perform.157 
Hence the exposition by Van der Merwe and others that a defendant commits 
anticipatory breach just by creating uncertainty as to whether he will perform 
or not.158 This is in line with the section 251(1) right of suspension provided 
in the Restatement, which can be invoked based on a “reasonable suspicion” 
of non-performance. If the Erasmus right of suspension can be extended also 
to cover repudiation in the sense described by Van der Merwe and others, the 
American position will be more or less reflected in South African law.
6  Reciprocity after termination of a contract
The next inquiry is into two related concepts, namely whether rights 
accrued under a contract can survive the termination of that contract, whether 
153 Compare the similar provision in art 71 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (1980) (“CISG”) and art 7 3 4 of the UNIDROIT UNIDROIT Principles of 
Commercial Contracts (2010)  See further D Saidov “Anticipatory Non-Performance and Underlying 
Values of the Unidroit Principles” (2006) 11 Uniform Law Review 795
154 The UCC was promulgated in 1972
155 R Robertson “The Right to Demand Adequate Assurance of Due Performance: Uniform Commercial 
Code Section 2-609 and Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 251” (1988) 38 Drake L Rev 305 
351-353
156 Carter “Suspending Performance” in Good Faith and Fault 490  Compare the argument in J Carter, 
A Phang & S Phang “Performance Following Repudiation: Legal and Economic Interests” (1999) 15 J 
Contract L 97  The authors of this paper argue that it is in the interests of the community that economic 
resources are not wasted on pointless performance of a repudiated contract  Damages should rather be 
mitigated by “accepting” the repudiation and/or not tendering a nugatory performance  See especially 
121-131
157 Datacolor International (Pty) Ltd v Intamarket (Pty) Ltd 2001 2 SA 284 (SCA) para 16
158 Van der Merwe et al Contract 358
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by cancellation for breach or rescission for flawed consensus. In both cases 
one needs to decide whether performance is excused retrospectively (ex nunc), 
in which case accrued rights remain enforceable, or merely prospectively (ex 
tunc), in which case these fall away.
6 1  Cancellation for breach: survival of accrued rights
This problem arises where performances by one party (for example, 
payments under a building contract) are due in instalments during the course 
of counter-performance by the other party. If the contract is validly cancelled 
before completion of the (building) work, what happens to the right to payment 
instalments which had accrued prior to cancellation? The leading South 
African case is Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v Grafton 
Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd159 (“Thomas Construction”):
Thomas Construction had been engaged by Grafton to build a new 
factory and administration buildings for its furniture business. During the 
performance of the terms of this contract, Thomas Construction was liquidated 
and the building contracts were never completed. The buildings thus had to 
be completed by a third party. Before the liquidation of Thomas Construction, 
however, two certificates had been issued to it (one by an engineer and the 
other by an architect) indicating that building work had reached the stage 
where an instalment of the contract price was due. Upon liquidation of Thomas 
Construction, Grafton validly cancelled the building contract.
The court, however, accepted the test as laid down in Crest Enterprises 
(Pty) Ltd v Rycklof Beleggings (Edms) Bpk160 (“Crest Enterprises”) that in 
order for a right to payment to be enforceable, it must, prior to rescission of 
the contract by acceptance of the opposing party’s repudiation, be “accrued, 
due and enforceable as a cause of action independent of any executory part 
of the contract”.161 Nienaber J noted with regard to this test that cancellation 
sometimes operates ex nunc (de futuro) and sometimes ex tunc (ab initio) and 
hence the words “independent of any executory part of the contract” were vital 
to the determination of enforceability of the right to payment as a whole.162 In 
the case of continuing contracts such as lease, rescission would usually operate 
de futuro, so that obligations which had accrued prior to cancellation would 
remain unaffected by this act.163 Where the performance was not divisible in 
this way, such as with a sale (generally speaking), the accrued right would not 
be independent of the executory part of the contract.164 One factor bearing on 
this would be the nature of the obligation involved; others were considerations 
159 1986 4 SA 510 (N)  Upheld on appeal: Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v Grafton Furniture 
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1988 2 SA 546 (A)
160 1972 2 SA 863 (A)
161 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986 4 SA 
510 (N) 511G-I  This test was laid down in Crest Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Rycklof Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 
1972 2 SA 863 (A) 869H-870G, with reference to the earlier case of Walker’s Fruit Farms Ltd v Sumner 
1930 TPD 394
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of “severability, mutuality of performance” and possibly even whether the 
“partially executed performance was physically capable of restoration”.165
Nienaber J discussed the fact that working capital was necessary for 
building contracts to function and hence the inquiry could not be simply 
whether work had been properly completed as in BK Tooling.166 However, 
the sum paid in such an instalment was an advance on the completion sum 
and hence the making of such payment was balanced not only against partial 
completion, but also against “willingness and ability to complete the rest 
of the work”.167 Although such ability to complete the work might not be a 
“formal pre-condition” for payment, it does emphasise the “inherent link” 
between the completion certificate and the executory part of the contract.168 
For this reason, the claim of Thomas Construction could not be said to be 
independent of the executory part of the contract.169 Nienaber J thus saw the 
performance of the contractor as an entirety, rather than a continuous series of 
divisible obligations. A contractor in the position of Thomas Construction, he 
held, should look to remedies other than the certificate to exact compensation 
for work done (ie enrichment).170
As Nienaber J went on at this point to discuss, the position is different 
in English law.171 Peel notes that the effect of termination for breach on a 
party’s obligation to perform under a contract (whether or not he is the one in 
breach) is that he is released from obligations which have not yet fallen due.172 
However, a party remains liable for those obligations which had already fallen 
due at the time of termination for breach, unless such payment was one which 
he could have recovered, such as where there has been unjustified enrichment 
of the opposing party.173 The proposition of interest for cases like Thomas 
Construction is the second one, for which Peel relies on Stocznia Gdanska SA 
v Latvian Shipping Co174 (“Stocznia”) as primary authority. In the Stocznia 
case the House of Lords applied its earlier ruling in Hyundai Heavy Industries 
Ltd v Papadopoulos175 (“Hyundai”), the case cited by Nienaber J as authority 
for the English position on this problem.176
Both Stocznia and Hyundai involved claims by shipbuilders for instalments 





169 518B-C  The Appellate Division arrived at the opposite conclusion in the subsequent case of Shelagatha 
Property Investments CC v Kellywood Homes (Pty) Ltd; Shelfaerie Property Holdings CC v Midrand 
Shopping Centre (Pty) Ltd 1995 3 SA 187 (A)  There it was the employer who had breached the agreement 
and the court enforced payment on an interim certificate issued to the contractor, arguing that the 
factual context was different to Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v Grafton Furniture 
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986 4 SA 510 (N) (192I-195E)
170 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986 4 SA 
510 (N) 518C
171 518E-519D
172 Peel Treitel The Law of Contract 18-013
173 18-013
174 [1998] 1 WLR 574 (HL)
175 [1980] 1 WLR 1129 (HL)
176 Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [1998] 1 WLR 574 (HL) 587A-B (Lord Goff) and 599A-H 
(Lord Lloyd)
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the breach was by the buyers of the ships and these parties were held liable 
to pay for the instalments due under the partially completed contracts.177 A 
complicating factor in these cases (as set out above) is as to whether there 
had been a “total failure of consideration”, that is that the defendant had not 
received its “promised counter-performance”.178 As Burrows notes, however, 
for this defence to apply, the failure of consideration must be “total”.179 In both 
cases the contract had been not merely to purchase a ship, but also to design 
and build it.180 Although no ship was ultimately delivered due to the breach, 
the design and construction parts of the contract were carried out and hence 
it could not be said that there had been a “total” failure of consideration.181
Nienaber J notes in his discussion of the Hyundai case that the requirement 
of enforceability “independent of the executory part of the contract” is not 
included in English law and thus remains a South African invention.182 
Nienaber J’s criticism of the English position is that it takes no account of the 
contractor’s willingness and ability to complete the executory portion of the 
contract.183 Of course that criticism is limited to contracts of the kind which 
was litigated in Thomas Construction, where something is being built for 
the defendant. While this comment will thus largely pertain in building (and 
related) contracts, this is also largely the field in which this type of problem 
seems to arise. The rule in Crest Enterprises seems to be entirely appropriate 
to the present circumstances and Nienaber J’s application thereof in Thomas 
Construction seems to address the issues in a satisfactory manner. The South 
African position would thus seem to provide a nuanced take on the equivalent 
English approach and to do so without the confusion of the English doctrine 
of total failure of consideration.
How is reciprocity served by the finding in Thomas Construction? The 
requirement of independent enforceability of the litigated right to payment 
ensures an examination of which obligations are reciprocal to which in 
a manner that the less refined English approach misses. This means that 
in order to apply the Crest Enterprises test there will need to be a careful 
consideration of issues of reciprocity pertaining to a particular contractual 
context, in other words which performances were agreed as being reciprocal 
in the initial contract and what was the nature of the bargain struck between 
the parties. This quid pro quo inquiry will prevent an unreciprocated payment 
under a contract, thereby discouraging breach by contractors and ensuring the 
mitigation of future damages claims, since the contractor in breach will not 
be able to claim for outstanding amounts where it has not properly fulfilled its 
obligations under a building contract as a whole.
177 Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [1998] 1 WLR 574 (HL) 584F-587C (Lord Goff for the 
majority) and Hyundai Heavy Industries Ltd v Papadopoulos [1980] 1 WLR 1129 (HL) 1136A-B
178 Compare A Burrows The Law of Restitution 3 ed (2011) 319
179 322-323
180 323
181 323  Compare Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [1998] 1 WLR 574 (HL) 587D-590H
182 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986 4 SA 
510 (N) 518E-519D
183 518E-519D
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6 2  Voidable contracts: restitutio in integrum
The problem of partial performance also arises in the context of voidable 
contracts. Where consensus has been obtained through improper means, the 
innocent party has an election whether to abide by the contract or to resile 
from it.184 Following a rescission of a contract, restitution of whatever has 
been received under that contract should take place.185 The question arises 
then as to whether this should occur ex tunc (from the moment of contracting) 
or ex nunc (from the moment of rescission). In a contract where performance 
is rendered on a continuous basis, such as lease, this becomes an important 
question.186 In this type of case reciprocity is a key value, since performance 
(use of the premises) cannot be restored to the lessor and it would not therefore 
be fair to require him to restore the reciprocal counter-performance of rent 
tendered up to that point on a monthly basis.
Consider the leading case of Extel Industrial (Pty) Ltd v Crown Mills (Pty) 
Ltd187 (“Extel Industrial”). Here the directors of the appellant had obtained 
a contract to supply partially processed sausage casings to the respondent 
company through the bribery of two of the respondent’s managers. It was 
held that this tainted the conclusion of the contract and gave the right to the 
respondent to resile from the contract.188 One of the grounds on which the 
appellant resisted this claim was that the sausage casings had already been 
processed and sold on to third parties and could thus not be restored to them. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held on this point, however, that the fact that 
restitution was no longer physically possible without fault on the part of the 
rescinding party did not prevent rescission on this ground alone.189 The court 
held further that the act of cancellation of the contract in question was not 
invalidated due to the failure to tender restitution, since this “may well be to 
require the unattainable”.190
Reciprocity was thus not observed in Extel Industrial. It should be noted, 
however, that the contract in question was tainted by fraud, a fact which 
seemed to weigh heavily in the decision of the court.191 In the earlier case 
of Feinstein v Niggli192 (“Feinstein”) the Appellate Division had stated that 
a contract could not be set aside unless the innocent party was prepared to 
restore “completely everything that he has received under the contract”.193 
This was to prevent unjustified enrichment, despite the presence of fraud in 
184 Plaaslike Boeredienste (Edms) Bpk v Chemfos Bpk 1986 1 SA 819 (A) 848A-C; Extel Industrial (Pty) 
Ltd v Crown Mills (Pty) Ltd 1999 2 SA 719 (SCA) 730G-I; Van der Merwe et al Contract 103; Christie & 
Bradfield The Law of Contract 297-298
185 Extel Industrial (Pty) Ltd v Crown Mills (Pty) Ltd 1999 2 SA 719 (SCA) 730G-731A; Feinstein v Niggli 
1981 2 SA 684 (A) 700F-G
186 Van der Merwe et al Contract 139
187 1999 2 SA 719 (SCA)
188 Thus the traditional grounds on which contracts are voidable, namely misrepresentation, duress and 
undue influence were extended, as had been suggested in the earlier case of Plaaslike Boeredienste 
(Edms) Bpk v Chemfos Bpk 1986 1 SA 819 (A) 848A-D
189 Extel Industrial (Pty) Ltd v Crown Mills (Pty) Ltd 1999 2 SA 719 (SCA) 731D-E
190 732E-G
191 See, for example, 732D-G
192 1981 2 SA 684 (A)
193 700F-G
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the transaction.194 In that case, however, the property in question consisted 
of shares, which had depreciated in value. The court permitted rescission, 
despite the fact that the performance tendered in restitution was no longer of 
its original value.195 This qualification of the extreme position set out in that 
case was said to be based on “equity and justice”.196
What is clear in this debate is that the issue of restitution following rescission 
of a voidable contract is not a clear-cut issue, but will involve a consideration 
of the substance of the case itself and will not be applied as a blanket rule 
irrespective of the facts involved. Van der Merwe and others note that the 
question as to whether restitution must occur ex nunc or ex tunc has not been 
finally decided in South African law.197 It is submitted, however, that in a 
contract where there has been performance of a continuing nature over time, 
the issue should be resolved on the basis of divisibility of the performance 
in question and that the rule in Crest Enterprises could play a valuable role 
in this context as well.198 If performance is not divisible, as in Feinstein and 
Extel Industrial, the requirement of reciprocity may have to be relaxed in the 
interests of fairness. In such an event, the existence of fraud on the part of 
one of the parties should be taken into account in deciding whether to allow 
rescission, despite the contrary dictum in Feinstein.
7  Reciprocity in severable contracts: divisibility of 
performances or obligations
Reciprocity plays a key role in determining a fair solution to the problem 
which occurs when an obligation becomes partially unenforceable. If the 
duty to make the primary performance is excused, due to supervening 
impossibility for example, is the counter-performance also excused? What 
if only part of the primary performance becomes impossible and part has 
already been performed? The inquiry here delves into the fields of divisibility 
(or severability) of obligations; and of performance and counter-performance. 
The leading South African case is Bob’s Shoe Centre v Heneways Freight 
Services (Pty) Ltd199 (“Bob’s Shoe Centre”).
The appellant retailer of shoes imported a consignment of merchandise 
from Portugal. The shoes were collected from the Portuguese factory, where 
they had been manufactured, by a Portuguese forwarding agent and placed 
on board an aircraft to travel to Johannesburg. At the (then) Jan Smuts airport 
the goods were placed in a bonded warehouse to await customs clearance. It 
was common cause that the respondent clearing agent had contracted with 
Bob’s Shoe Centre to obtain this clearance and to transport the shoes from the 
warehouse to the retail premises in Johannesburg. Bob’s Shoe Centre argued 




197 Van der Merwe et al Contract 139
198 See above at part 6 1
199 1995 2 SA 421 (A)
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shoes from the Portuguese factory, but Heneways disputed this. Heneways 
obtained customs clearance for the goods, but when its employees arrived at 
the warehouse the shoes had been stolen.
As a result of the theft, the remaining obligations of Heneways were 
discharged due to supervening impossibility. Heneways then contended that 
the performance obligation was divisible and claimed payment for services 
rendered up to that point; Bob’s Shoe Centre maintained that performance was 
indivisible and that supervening impossibility had discharged its obligation 
to pay Heneways at all under the contract. Thereupon Heneways instituted 
action for the sums spent in obtaining customs clearance and in paying the 
forwarding agent for transporting the goods to Johannesburg.
The appellant’s defence was based on the exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus.200 The principle of reciprocity, it argued, discharged it from paying 
for any part of the services rendered, since its own claim for performance 
could be met by the defence of supervening impossibility. Thus the major 
question facing the Appellate Division was whether the obligations created by 
the contract between the parties were divisible. The question of divisibility, 
in turn, had to be determined with reference to the rules on the severability of 
provisions of a contract.201 The test for divisibility thus turned largely on the 
intention of the contracting parties – that is, whether they would have entered 
that contract without the (divisible/severable) provision in question.202
Grosskopf JA held that the evidence established that the appellant had 
wanted an expert to attend to the transportation of the goods from the factory 
in Portugal to the airport, but that no such specialist was required for the 
transport to the retail premises from the airport.203 Hence the parties would 
have concluded the contract without the last leg of the transport obligation 
and this was therefore severable.204 The appeal was thus dismissed and Bob’s 
Shoe Centre was ordered to abide by the finding of the court a quo, which had 
awarded payment to Heneways for the performance it had rendered.205
Thus it seems clear that the question of whether obligations are divisible 
depends on the intention of the parties to the contract.206 This is the same test 
as for the severability of obligations, as accepted by the Appellate Division in 
Bob’s Shoe Centre with reference to Van der Merwe and others’ textbook on 
contract law.207 This position is fairly well established in the South African case 
law.208 With regard to the history of these rules, however, it should be noted 
200 428E-F
201 429D  The court cited Van der Merwe et al Contract as authority for this view  This view is maintained in 
Van der Merwe et al Contract 315
202 430G-H  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) was cited (inter alia) as authority for this proposition
203 Bob’s Shoe Centre v Heneways Freight Services (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 SA 421 (A) 430I-431B
204 430I-431B
205 431B; 433D
206 Bob’s Shoe Centre v Heneways Freight Services (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 SA 421 (A) 430G-H; Collen v Rietfontein 
Engineering Works 1948 1 SA 413 (A) 434-436; Du Plooy v Sasol Bedryf (Edms) Bpk 1988 1 SA 438 (A) 
451A-B; Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 16A-B; Van der Merwe et al Contract 313; De Wet & 
Van Wyk Kontraktereg 145
207 See n 201 above
208 See the sources in n 206 above
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that Joubert JA conceded in Du Plooy v Sasol Bedryf (Edms) Bpk209 that he had 
consulted the writings of Pothier and Von Glück (a German Pandectist) but had 
found no answer in the South African common law.210
The identification of divisibility of performance with severability of 
obligations rests on the fact that both deal with the question as to the subsidiary 
nature of a particular provision in a contract.211 The test (as we have seen) is 
therefore whether the parties would have entered into that contract without the 
particular provision.212 Since it had been proven that counter-performance was 
divisible (the payment of money), this created a presumption that the primary 
performance was divisible too, provided the thus divided performance could 
be said to relate to a distinct element of the counter-performance which 
had been performed.213 This was possible in Bob’s Shoe Centre, since the 
payment by the shoe store could easily be allocated to the discrete parts of 
Heneways’ performance. Thus the Appellate Division equated divisibility 
with severability and came to its conclusion based upon which obligations 
could be said to fit together. In this way the partial performance did not go 
unrewarded due to the supervening impossibility of the obligation as a whole.
English law deals with the problem raised in Bob’s Shoe Centre by means 
of statute. The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 states that if 
parts of a frustrated contract have been wholly performed and can be severed 
from the frustrated portion, they are to be treated as separate contracts.214 
Performance rendered under the frustrated portions will give rise to a claim 
for restitution under the Act.215 The test for severance of promises in English 
law is very generally stated in terms of the following three propositions: the 
promise must be of a kind which can be severed; it must not be necessary to 
redraft the contract after the severance (the so-called “blue pencil” test); and 
the severance must not alter the nature of the contract.216
The English approach is thus different to the South African approach in 
terms of its authoritative source (as set out in Bob’s Shoe Centre), but the 
practical result seems to be largely the same. The dearth of authority in this 
area of South African law is revealing, although the case law seems fairly 
settled. Once again, reciprocity could be used by both sides in Bob’s Shoe 
Centre to strengthen their respective cases – the appellant relied on the 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus, while the respondent’s counterclaim 
could be said to rest on the notion of receiving its “fair” contract price as the 
reciprocal tender for services rendered and sums outlayed. The determination 
of the Appellate Division in casu dealt with the substance of the matter and 
the respective intentions of the parties, before arriving at what appears on its 
209 1988 1 SA 438 (A)
210 453I-454A  It should be noted, however, that Voet 21 1 4 discusses divisibility of the merx in the context 
of the actio redhibitoria, arguing that divisibility depends on the intention of the parties  This passage is 
cited in Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 1 SA 413 (A) 434
211 Bob’s Shoe Centre v Heneways Freight Services (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 SA 421 (A) 430G-H
212 430G-H
213 430B
214 S 2(4) of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act  See Peel Treitel The Law of Contract 19-106
215 S 1 of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act  See Peel Treitel The Law of Contract 19-106
216 11-159–11-162
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face to be a “fair” solution. While the appellant’s stance was individualist 
and attempted to invoke a rule against enforcement, the substance of the 
matter and community notions of fairness ensured that the respondent was 
compensated for its outlays in service of the contract with the appellant.
8  Conclusion
The notion of reciprocity is a fairly straightforward one to explain: this 
article has made fairly extensive use of the Latin phrase quid pro quo in 
this regard. The issue of what reciprocity entails for contract law, however, 
is far more difficult to unpack than this simplistic formula. ESE Financial 
Services and BK Tooling tell us that in order to determine whether obligations 
are reciprocal one should interpret the contract in question. This holds true 
in most cases, since one must determine whether two performances are 
sufficiently closely linked to create the link entailed in reciprocity. Sometimes 
that link will be obvious (such as purchase price in exchange for merx in a 
contract of sale), but sometimes closer examination of the contract as a whole 
will be required. This should be both an objective and a subjective analysis, 
so that the presence (for example) of a clause expressly excluding reciprocity 
should not always be taken at face value, but weighed against the objective 
intentions of the parties and the natural incidents of the type of contract in 
question. Thus this article upholds the view in the two cases mentioned above 
that interpretation will reveal reciprocity in contractual obligations, subject 
to a judicial discretion to refuse to recognise an expressly stipulated (lack of) 
reciprocity where the context of the contract indicates otherwise.
Then, on the question of the right of retention of performance, which arises 
out of the reciprocity principle, the exceptio non adimpleti contractus has 
been examined at some length herein. Indeed, this has been shown to have 
been accepted as a self-help mechanism available to parties since medieval 
times. Given the high costs of litigation today, there can be no doubt as to the 
value of enforcement procedures which do not involve lawyers’ fees. Fairness 
requires that in a situation where one party has not performed, he should 
not be able to force performance from the other. At the same time, however, 
“fairness” is a discretionary concept, and in the same way that the enforcement 
of contractual rights through specific performance may lead to hardship and 
injustice, so too, the withholding of contractual performance may have these 
results. This is illustrated by the facts of BK Tooling very clearly. Hence the 
same judicial discretion which governs specific performance must also govern 
the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. This is an important contribution to 
the law on the exceptio and underlines the lasting value of the decision in BK 
Tooling. Thus the exceptio is a straightforward self-help mechanism, but one 
which must operate within the bounds of the law and judicial policy making.
Beyond this mechanism, however, reciprocity in contract law may entitle a 
party to withhold performance where counter-performance is not forthcoming, 
even in a situation where specific performance is not demanded. This article 
has examined several problem areas of this type which reciprocal obligations 
throw up for contract law. In the same way that fairness was achieved through 
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judicial discretion in BK Tooling, so too has there been an attempt to bring 
fairness to other areas beyond the defective performance, such as anticipatory 
breach, accrued rights under cancelled contracts, rescission and restitution 
and the concept of divisibility of performance in contract law.
In addition an historical account of the eradication of the doctrine of causa 
from South African law in the early 20th century was set out. This article 
showed that there is no inquiry into the respective values of exchanged 
performances, so that equivalence in exchange, as required by Aristotle, 
was not necessary for South African contract law (or indeed other Western 
systems of contract law). Thus reciprocity would seem to play a role in the 
enforcement of contractual provisions, but beyond the (irrelevant) motives of 
the parties, not in the conclusion of a contract.
Continuing on the historical theme, a further aim of this article was 
to demonstrate the ancient origins of reciprocity in contract law through 
an examination of the contribution of Aristotle to this area. The notion of 
equivalence in exchange was at the heart of Aristotle’s concept of commutative 
justice and continued to play a role in medieval times. Although classical 
contract law does not require equivalence in this sense, there has been an 
increase in the role played by fairness in South African law in recent times. 
One might say that the pendulum is swinging from a climate of classical 
contract law to a more altruistic vision, as evidenced by the promulgation 
of statutes such as the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 and the National 
Credit Act 34 of 2005, as well as in the jurisprudence of our Constitutional 
Court surrounding public policy and the limits it places on contractual 
freedoms.217 Cases such as BK Tooling and those considered in part four of 
this contribution show a concern for the fairness inherent in the notion of 
reciprocity and hence indicate that no major revision of this area of contract 
law will be necessary in this new climate of legal altruism. The concern for 
justice in the 20th century case of BK Tooling has made this judgment into 
one of lasting influence and injects an element of policy-based fairness into 
the mechanism of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. Thus this self-help 
mechanism operates within carefully crafted limits, so that extra-judicial 
powers remain justiciable.
The resurgence of a concern for fairness in the case law of the 20th century 
manifests itself in this instance through the demonstration in BK Tooling and 
other cases discussed in this article that reciprocity in the sense of fair exchange 
is still a central value in contract law worldwide. Thus commutative justice 
remains a concern for the modern South African legal system, underlining the 
enduring notion it represents.
217 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC); Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) 
Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC)
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SUMMARY
Most modern contracts are bilateral in nature, implying a mutual exchange of promises in content. 
This raises the question of when such promises create obligations which can be said to be reciprocal. 
Furthermore, what remedy will a party have if a reciprocal performance is not forthcoming? This 
article aims to explore the concept of reciprocity in contracts historically and comparatively to 
demonstrate its impact on contract law worldwide. This will involve an excursus of the major contract 
law rules which this principle underlies. The contribution will explore in brief the major problem areas 
in South Africa (and worldwide) where reciprocity plays a determinative role. The main argument 
is that reciprocity, in the sense of fairness in exchange, is central to many South African contracts; 
without it contractual validity may be threatened and enforceability is lost.
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